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THE EVOLVING DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST FOREIGN
CORRUPTION: SOME NEW AND OLD
DILEMMAS FACING THE INTERNATIONAL
LAWYER
JUSCELINO F. COLARES*

For over tWo decades, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA ") and, more recently, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
("OECD Convention") have delineated to US. lawyers and their
clients which international transactions are proscribed and
punished as corrupt. However, like any other statute, the FCPA and
the OECD Convention are unable to cover all the permutations of
activity that would seemingly constitute transnational corruption.
This Article explores what is prohibited and permissible under the
FCPA and the OECD Convention, highlighting the tension between
operating outside the coverage of these legal precepts while still
complying with the rules of professional conduct. It concludes by
demonstrating, by means of various scenarios, that there is no
substitute for a lawyer's reliance on· her professional and ethical
judgment.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; J.D. (2003), Cornell Law
School; Ph.D. (1994), Political Economy, The University of Tennessee; LL.B. (1989), summa cum
laude (and first-in-class honors), Universidade de Brasilia/Universidade Federal do Ceara, Brazil.
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INTRODUCTION t

Lawyers are constantly aware of the ethical dilenunas that may arise
during the representation of a client, particularly when the client's
activities cross national borders, where applicability of the norms
governing routine domestic practice may be in doubt. 1 These ethical issues
are heightened by the dilemma an attorney faces when notit1ed of a
transaction that, though lucrative to the client, may expose the client to
liability under the domestic laws that have extraterritorial reach. 2 In these
situations, U.S. lawyers are often put in the position of attempting to
reconcile their responsibility to the client with their overarching duty to
uphold the word and spirit of the law. 3

t The author thanks Jennifer Schultz for reviewing several versions of this Article and for her
thoughtful insights and suggestions. This Article would not have been ready for publication without
Ms. Schultz's encouragement. The author would also like to thank Emily Westerberg Russell for her
comments and suggestions with respect to earlier drafts. Any errors, however, are the author's own.
The views expressed herein are the author's own and do not reflect the views of his prior clients or any
prior or pending cases in which he participated.
1. In 2002, Transparency International reported that one in five respondents to a Gallup
International poll across fifteen emerging market economies was aware of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention" or "Convention"),
notably the same result to that obtained in the same survey conducted in 1999. Transparency
International, Transparency Intemational Releases New Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 2002,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/bpi2002 (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). Transparency
International's own Bribe Payers Index ("BPI") survey revealed that forty-two percent of the 835
respondents surveyed had not heard about the OECD Convention, with only seven percent being
familiar with the Convention. Id. The survey also indicated that a vecy small portion of overseas
business executives, including executives of western multinational corporations, were informed about
or planned to enforce the OECD Convention.Id.
2. Though not reviewed here, there is an abundance of U.S. laws and regulations that discipline
international business transactions, often reaching conduct taking place abroad. Among these are the
Cuban Libert<; and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERT AD) Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton") (22 U.S.C.
§ 6001 et seq. (2000)), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
(2000)), the Trading with the Enemy Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 95a, 95b) (trade sanctions and embargoes
against several countries), the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(l) (2000)), the State
Department;s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.P.R. §§ 121, 123 (2005)), U.S. export
controls under the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a) lapsed but in force under 50
U.S.C. § 1701) and Export Administration Regulations ("EAR") (15 C.P.R. §§ 730 et seq. (2005)), the
Iran Sanctions Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701 note, renewed by Pub. L. No. 107-24 (Aug. 3, 2001)), the
Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 el seq.), the Department of Commerce "Antiboycott
Law" (15 C.P.R.§ 760), and the Treasury Department "Antiboycott Law" (l.R.C. § 999 (1999)).
3. The obligation to heed to the spirit and letter of the law certainly extends well beyond
international business practice and encompasses the entire legal profession. As a commentator has
pointed out, the official commentary to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (1994) ("Model Rules") is "replete with admonitions to obey the spirit of the law." Rob
Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 283
n.l04 (1995).
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For over two decades, the Foreign Corrupt. Practices Act ("FCPA"t
has delineated to U.S. lawyers and their clients which international
transactions are proscribed and punished as corrupt. 5 While the FCPA
specifically defines what constitutes corrupting a foreign official, it also
raises difficult and complex legal, ethical, judgmental, and
representational issues for lawyers and their clients. 6 Like any other
legislative enactment, the PCPA is unable to cover all the permutations of
activity that would seemingly fall within the definition of transnational
corruption. 7 As such, the FCPA leaves counsel in the precarious position
of attempting to preserve the client's commercial interests and maneuver
within the bounds of the law while struggling with the possibility that the
client's actions, although technically legal, may be contrary to the goals of
the law. 8

4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (issuers' duty to report), 78dd-I(issuers), dd-2 (domestic concerns), dd3 (any person), 78ff (other penalties)); see also S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,4101.
5. See id. The statute:
make[s] it a crime for a "domestic concern," "issuer," or "any person" not already covered as
a domestic concern or issuer (and their officers, directors, employees, agents and shareholders
acting on their behalf) to commit, with any required territorial nexus to the United States, an
act [in the United States or abroad] in furtherance of a payment of an offer, promise, or
authorization of a payment, of money or anything of value to a foreign official corruptly to
secure that official's action, inaction or influence, in a decision related to a business
opportunity.
Lucinda A. Low & William M. McGlone, Avoiding Problems Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, U.S. Antiboycott Laws, OFAC Sanctions, Export Controls, and the Economic Espionage Act, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE UPDATE 2004: TRENDS, TIPS AND PRACTICAL ADVICE, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERS.ITYLAW CENTER, at 136 (Jan. 29-30, 2004) (on file with author).
6. See I 5 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a), -I (g), -2(a), -3(a) (2000). Notably, lawyers and their clients have
to be alert to the broad interpretation that federal law enforcement officials give to this statute. One
example: the Department of Justice ("DOJ") broadly defines FCPA. prohibitions as "prohibit[ing]
corrupt payments to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or keeping business." DEPAR1MENT
OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTffiRIBERY PROVISIONS, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crirninallfraud/fcpa!dojdocb.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). For an interesting
and qnick example of the complex world surrounding FCPA compliance, see also Northrop Grumman
Electronic Systems, http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/Our_Values/rtew-employees/FCPA.htm
(providing a "test yourself' FCPA-related set of questions) (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. See id. Argnably, a lawyer's concern with his client's interests also extends to the protection
of his client's public image, which can be significantly damaged if the public perceives certain conduct
as bribery. One commentator has described this situation:
Bribery is a breach of people's trust. People find corruption shameful and repugnant, and
when confronted with corrupt public officials and their illicit gains, they invariably reject it.
The difference today is that, in the modem electronic world, it is more obvious when it
happens and more difficult to deny it.
A. Timothy Martin, The Development ofInternational Bribery Law, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 95,
102 (1999).
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Before developing some of the basic legal and ethical themes
associated with "corruption" in international business transactionsthemes later analyzed in Part IV-this Article first summarizes the content
of the FCPA in Part I. Because the PCPA is not the only law to prescribe
criminal liability to U.S. companies who engage in corrupt practices, Part
ll will also briefly referto other applicable statutes.
Part III will then discuss the 1997 Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
("OECD Convention" or "Convention"), and show how it has given new
impetus to the task of combating foreign corruption arising out of
international business transactions. 9 The Convention represents a sea of
change in the international community's attitude toward bribery and
corruption, an area where the United States previously stood alone with
legislation combating this form of corruption. 10 Beyond leveling the
playing field in the international business arena, the Convention greatly
streamlines prosecutions under the PCPA because, among other things, it
applies the nationality principle of jurisdiction. 11 This principle
significantly expands the jurisdictional basis for the prosecution of U.S.
companies and U.S. nationals engaging in corruption practices that "take
place wholly outside of the United States, regardless of whether 'an
instrumentality of interstate commerce' is used in furtherance of tlie
prohibited conduct." 12 In Part III, this Article also explores some

9. For about two decades since 1977, the United States was the only country that had antiforeign-conuption legislation like the FCPA. After the FCPA's enactment, the most significant effort
aiming to deter corrupt practices in .the conduct of international business occurred under the auspices
of the OECD, with the signing of a convention against bribery of foreign officials, the OECD
Convention. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) ("OECD Convention"), available at http://www.oecd.org/
document/21/0,2340;en_2649_::201185_201 7813_1_1_1_1 ,OO.himl (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). Though
less ambitious; the. Organization of American States adopted the I:riter-American Convention Against
Corruption, OEA/Ser.K.XXXIV.l, CICOR/doc. 14/96 rev. 2 (Mar. 29, 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M.
724 (1996), and the Council of Europe followed suit by promulgating the Council of Europe Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption on January 27, 1999. 38 I.L.M. 505 (1999), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/173.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
10. See John W. Brooks, Fighting International Corruption, 20 GPSolo 42 (LEXIS) (2003)
("The most significant development recently in international corruption law is the . . . OECD
Convention ... that entered into force in 1999 .").
11. OECD Convention, supra note 9,art. 4, para. 2.
12. See id. But see Stuart H. Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 331NT'L LAW. 507,514 (1999)
(arguing that due to precedents of extraterritorial application of other federal statutes, the FCPA's
territorial nexus is minimal, and that, therefore, the OECD Convention's reliance on nationality as a
basis for jurisdiction does not represent a significant change).
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distinctions between the approaches to foreign corruption contemplated in
the FCPA and OECD Convention~
.
Part IV will then develop three hypothetical examples that may (or may
not) involve corruption under the present anti-bribery legal framework.
The goal is to explore what is prohibited and permissible under the FCPA
and the OECD Convention and to highlight the tension between operatii"lg
outside the coverage of these legal precepts and complying with the rules
of professional conduct. The legal analysis of these possible "corruption
scenarios" will serve not only to draw attention to some complex legal and
ethical problems that occur in foreign business transactions, but also to
show how there are problems still not covered by the present anti-foreignbribery regime. The Article then concludes by revealing the need for
lawyers to rely on the professional rules of conduct to guide their actions
through the inherent legal gaps in this area.
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

A. Background of the FCPA

In 1974, the United States was still reeling from the general loss of
public trust resulting from the Watergate debacle when a new scandal
emerged. 13 Due to illegal payments some U.S. corporations had made to
domestic political campaigns, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") created a voluntary disclosure program. 14 In the resulting
disclosures, over 300 companies admitted to making questionable
payments, both domestically and abroad. 15 The public responded
overwhelming with disgust, with Congress sharing in the public's
sentiment. 16 The scandal reached far beyond the borders of the United
States 17 and contributed to a legislative response that resulted in the
passage Of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 197'7. 18

13. See Martin, supra note 8, at 97.
14. Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look
at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. LJ. 1559, 1582 (1990); see also DOJ Website, supra note 6
("As a result of SEC investigations in the mid-1970's, over 400 U.S. companies admitted making
questionable or illegal payments in excess of $300 million to foreign government officials, politicians,
and political parties.").
15. Id.; S. REP. No. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101. But see
Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economics in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J.
lNT'L L. 121, 123 (1996) ("[A]s many as 600 American firms made payments to foreign officials
....").
16. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,4099.
17. "Foreign governments friendly to the United States in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands have
come under intense pressure from their own people." S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3, reprinted in 1977
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As originally drafted, the FCP A proscribed the payment of bribes to
foreign officials in exchange for foreign government contracts or other
types ofbusiness. 19 The FCPA was almost immediately met with criticism.
The primary argument was that the FCP A prevents American companies
from effectively competing in international settings where "gifts" and
"tributes" are the norm. 20
One can respond to much of this criticism with two separate, though
related, arguments: (a) corporate bribery of foreign officials, if left
unchecked, would "also affect our domestic competitive climate"; 21 and
(b) the investing public has the right to lrnow whether they are investing in
corporations that have engaged in unethical conduct. That access to the
relatively cheap money, readily available in U.S. capital markets (i.e., via
the issuance of stocks, private bonds, or other debt instruments, etc.),
should be limited to companies that do not engage in less than competitive
behavior seems to strike a fair capitalistic bargain.
Since its enactment, the FCPA has undergone several amendments.
Most notably, in 1988, Congress added several affirmative defenses (e.g.,
"lawful payment," "reasonable and bona fide expenditure," etc.), 22 made
the mens rea requirement stricter (i.e., requiring lrnowledge rather than
recklessness), 23 and expanded the legislative record to further broaden the
meaning of some original statutory provisions (e.g., clarifying the meaning
of "retaining business," etc.). 24 At the same time, Congress reviewed and
increased the formal penalties for violating the anti-bribe1y provisions. 25 A

U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,4101.
18. 13 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRES. Doc. 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977); see also Mark Romaneski,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of I977: An Analysis of Its Impact and Future, 5 B.C. 1NT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 405, 405 n.2; Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as a.rnended in scattered
sections oftitle 15 of the United States Code).
19. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (issuers' duty to report), 78dd-1(issuers), -2 (domestic concerns), -3
(any person), 78ff (other penalties) (2000)).
20. See Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Ambiguities in the Foreign Cormpt Practices Act: Unnecessmy
Costs ofFighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861, 869 n.57 (2001) (citing RobertS. Levy, Note, The
Antibribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Are They Really As Valuable As
We Think They Are?, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 82 (1985).
21. S. REP. No, 95-114, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101 ("Foreign
corporate bribes also affect our domestic competitive climate when domestic frrms engage in such
practices as a substitute for healthy competition for foreign business.").
22. H.R. REP. No. 100-418, at 921-23 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1949, 1954--56. Tbe conference agreement defined "lawful payment" as "a payment to a foreign
official [that] is 'lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official's country.'" !d. at
1955 (emphasis added).
23. !d. at 919, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1952.
24. ld. at 918, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1951.
25. Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtitle A, pt.I, § 5003(b), 102 Stat. I 415, 1419 (1988).
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civil fine of up to $10,000 was introduced as a possible sanction/ 6 and the
maximum criminal fine for a U.S. corporation was increased from $1
miiiion to $2 million. 27 Finaiiy, in late 1998, the FCPA was updated to
28
conform to the new OECD Convention.
B. FCPA 's Framework

The FCPA places several duties on American corporations,
businessmen and their agents. The statute prohibits both companies and
natural persons from offering, promising to offer, or authorizing the
payment of money, a "gift," or anything of value to a foreign official for
the purpose of securing influence, inaction, or a contract to obtain or
maintain business. 29 Furthermore, since 1998 the FCPA has applied to any
foreign entity or foreign national who commits an act in furtherance of a
foreign bribe while in U.S. 'territory. 30 In addition, U.S.-registered
security-issuing corporations31 (i.e., "issuers") subject to SEC regulation
have the additional duty to comply with SEC accounting and recordkeeping requirements for disclosing their payments. 32
The anti bribery provisions of the PCPA can be broken down into three
separate segments: (a) one applying to issuers (i.e., thus subject to civil
enforcement through the SEC); 33 (b) one applying to domestic concerns
(i.e., subject to civil and criminal enforcement by the Department of
Justice ("DOJ")); 34 and (c) a catchaii provision applying to anyone who

26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), 78ff(c)(2)(A) (2000).
27. !d.§§ 78dd-2(g)(l)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A).
28. See discussion infra Part IILR
29. 15 U.S,C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2000).
30. See id. § 77dd-3 ("Prohibited foreign trade practices by persons other than issuers or
domestic concerns"). Congress extended statutory coverage to this category of individuals pursuant to
the U.S. efforts to bring FCPA in compliance with the OECD Convention. See discussion infra Part
IILB.
31. An "issuer" is a business entity that either (a) has a class of secUrities registered under
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or (b) is required to file reports pursuant to Section
15(d) of the same Act. 48 Stat. 881 (June 6, 1934), codified as amended in 15 U$.C. § 77b, et seq.
32. See generally 15 U$.C. § 78m(b) (2004). These record-keeping/disclosure requirements
create only corporate, not criminal liability. See Low & McGlone, supra note 5, at 136. These
provisions are beyond the scope of this article.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000). See also S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4109 ("When the SEC believes it has compiled enough evidence for a criminal
action, it refers the case to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.").
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2000). The statute explains:
For purposes of this section:
{I) the term "domestic concern" means(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and
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does not fall under either of the other two categories. 35 Much of the
language between the three segments is identical, and none of the
differences are significant for the purposes of this Article.
1. Jurisdiction of the FCPA

The FCPA sets forth two separate bases for jurisdiction: (a) the
standard territorial jurisdiction (i.e., jurisdiction resulting from some act
that establishes a nexus between the bribery and the United States
territory, thus triggering the U.S. territorial power to adjudicate); 36 and (2)
the more recently added (1998) nationality principle (i.e., jurisdiction
based on the U.S. nationality of an individual or legal person). 37
Traditionally, any act requiring the use of the mails or any other
instmmentality of interstate commerce in the course of bribing a foreign
official would trigger liability under the PCPA. 38 This included engaging
in efforts to cormpt a foreign official while on international travel, making
an international telephone call, sending a fax, or even an e-mail. 39 Thus, it
was nearly impossible to engage in any foreign official bribery without
violating the statute. Because this element is so easily met, counsel should
advise clients about the need to approach with great care any conduct that
could potentiaily evolve to or be interpreted as bribery. 40
Yet, despite its breadth, the usual cautionary warning is no longer
comprehensive enough. Congress, in 1998, expanded the jurisdiction of
the FCPA by prohibiting any U.S. corporation, business, or persons that
are nationals of the United States from bribing any foreign official
anywhere, 41 regardless of whether any part of the conduct involved an

(B) any corpo~~tion, pat--tnersltip, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business
in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
I d. § 78dd-2(h). See also S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 410910 ("Under the bill, the Justice Department retains sole investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction
over domestic concerns covered but which are not otherwise within the jurisdiction of the SEC.").
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2000) ("Prohibited foreign trade practices by persons other than issuers
or domestic concerns").
36. ld. §§ 78dd-J(a), -2(a), -3(a).
37. See id. §§ 78dd-l(g); 78dd-2(i) ("Alternative jurisdiction").
38. Jd. §§ 78dd-l(a), dd-2(a), dd-3(a). See also id. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5), 78dd-3(f)(5) (definition of
"interstate commerce.").
39. See id. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5), -3(f)(5).
40. See Dep't of Comm., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions,
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/fcpl.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
41. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-J(g), -2(i) (2000).
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instrumentality of interstate commerce. 42 Indeed, U.S. citizens, nationals,
and even residents are now all bound by the FCPA, just as corporations
incorporated within the United States43 and corporations subject to SEC
regulation. Thus, the FCPA reach now goes well beyond the already broad
jurisdictional requirement that a legal or natural person use an
instrumentality of interstate commerce to procure the bribery of a foreign
official.

2. MensRea
At the core of the FCPA is the prohibition of making a "corrupt"
payment to a foreign official. The three prongs of the statute address (a)
U.S. issuers anywhere, (b) domestic concerns anywhere, and (c) all others
(i.e., other U.S. persons anywhere, and foreign entities' or individuals'
acts while in U.S. territory). Each prong prohibits a person from
"corruptly" making a bribe, 44. but none provides a definition of "corruptly"
or "corrupt."45 The legislative history does, however, provide some
guidance. It explains that the use of the word "corruptly" embodies the
quid pro quo nature of the transaction: the briber gives something of value
with the expectation of influencing the foreign official "to wrongfully
direct business to the payor or his client."46
This also explains why the FCPA only criminalizes those corrupt
exchanges that are done knowingly. 47 With respect to what constitutes
"1m owing," the legislative history is very clear: merely pretending to look
away (i.e., willful blindness) does not work. 48 However, despite providing
a definition of what constitutes a "knowing" state of mind, the terms

42. For a discussion of why a U.S. resident would be covered by the statute, see Low &
McGlone, supra note 5, at 176 n.l2.
43. Congress extended statutory coverage to this category of individuals pursuant to the U.S.
efforts to bring FCPA in compliance with the OECD Convention. See discussion infra Part III.B.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2000).
45. See id.
46. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108. See also
Klich, supra note 15; accord Stanley S. Arkin, et al., Business Crime: Criminal Liability of the
Business Community, 18.04, 18-17 to 18-18 (Mattl1ew Bender 1990).
47. 15 u.s.c. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2), -2(h)(3), -3(f)(3) (2000).
48. H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 920 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949,
1953 ("If ... a defendant act[s] with reckless disregard [with respect to the occurrence of bribery] and
with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, the requirement of knowledge would be satisfied
unless the defendant actually believed [that such conduct is not bribery].") (quoting United States v.
Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270,287 n.37 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied sub nom. Lavelle v. United States, 414 U.S.
821 (1973)). See also discussion infra Part IV.A (describing a situation where reasonable diligence
would be required, and, thus, willful blindness would be ineffective) and note !51 (containing
additional quotation from the legislative record).
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employed by the statute (e.g., "substantially likely to occur," "firm belief,"
etc.) leave attorneys and courts with ample room for interpretation. 49 Here,
a more cautious approach is in order because corporations are especially
vulnerable due to the application of vicarious liability. For example, a
corporation can be prosecuted and held liable, even without having any
direct lmowledge of the offense, if it is closely affiliated with a subsidiary
that has lmowledge. In such instances, the law will impute the lmowledge
. 50
to the parent corporatiOn.

3. Restricted Conduct
The FCP A restricts any quid pro quo trade of something of value in
exchange for influence over the decision-making process of a foreign
official, 51 foreign political party, foreign political party official, or a
candidate for a foreign political office in the pursuit of obtaining or
retaining business. 52 Specifically, the term "foreign official" means any
employee of a foreign government or of a public international
organization, or any individual acting on behalf of any such entity. 53 In
addition, the FCPA prohibits knowingly giving anything ofvalue to a third
party who will pass a!! or part of the value to a foreign official, foreign
political party, foreign political party official, or a candidate for a foreign
political office. 54
In terms of what transactions are prohibited, the FCP A is written
broadly to include any payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, gift, or anything of value. 5: Notably, the statute

49. Id.
50. Taylor, supra note 20, at 874 (citing Stephen F. Black & Roger M. Witten, Complying with
the Foreign Comtpt Practices Act, § 1.01, in I BUSINESS LAW MONOGRAPHS, INTERNATIONAL
SERIES 3-6 (2000)). Note, however, that the FCPA's mens rea requirement still leaves open the
possibility of a defense of innocent intentions, i.e., that the defendant was acting under an erroneous
belief that the activities were not bribery. In such circumstances, however, reliance upon the advice of
counsel would be highly probative of a defendant's intent. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c), -2(c), -3(c)
(2000). See also discussion infra Part IV.A.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), -2(a)(l) (2000).
52. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), -2(a)(2).
53. Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A). With the adoption of the OECD Convention,
officials of public international organizations have also been included in FCP A. See International AntiBribery Act of 1998, H.R. REP. No. 105-802, pt. 3, at 9 (1998). For purposes of U.S. law, public
international organizations are only those entities that have been so designated by Executive Order
pursuant to Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-291
(Dec. 29, 1945) (22 U.S.C. § 288, et seq.).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3) (2000).
55. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a).
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does not require a completed transaction. Simply making a corrupt offer,
56
or even authorizing someone to make a corrupt offer, violates the FCPA.
The element that makes the actions in the FCPA illegal is the purpose
of the transaction. The transaction must be made for the purpose of
influencing an act or decision of a foreign official in his official capacity,
including the decision not to act, or to have the foreign official influence
the decisions of another foreign official or government entity. 57 It is
equally prohibited to engage in a transaction to "secure an improper
advantage." 58 Notably, the purpose of the transaction must be to secure
influence "in order to assist the [briber] in obtaining or retaining
59
business. "
It should be clear by now that the FCPA defines foreign corruption
very broadly, but it is not without its limits. In particular, the 1988
amendments to the FCPA were designed to create some limits to the
FCP A so that businesses were not unduly hindered by the restrictions. The
next Part will address the boundaries of the FCPA.

4. Limitations of the FCPA
There are three major exceptions to the general prohibitions in the
FCPA: (a) grease payments; 60 (b) legitimate business marketing; 61 and (c)
payments permitted by the written laws of the foreign country. 62
The grease-payment exception permits payments to governmental
officials intended to hasten the completion of a non-discretionary "routine
governmental action." 63 Routine governmental actions are those functions
for which the official has no decision-making authority. 64 Paying money to
accelerate processing of paperwork is thought of as the classic example. 65
The statute defines a few tasks as "routine," but also contains a catchall

56. Id.
57. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a)(l), -2(a){l).
58. Id.
59. Id. See also discussion infra Part l.B.4 (discussing FCPA's limitations).
60. 15 u.s.c. §§ 78dd-l{b), -2(b), -3(b) (2000).
61. Id. §§ 78dd-l{c){2), -2(c){2), -3(c){2).
62. Id. §§ 78dd-l{c)(l), -2(c){l), -3(c)(l).
63. Id. § 78dd-2{h){4)(B).
64.
The term "routine governmental action" does not include any decision, by a foreign official
whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular
party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to
encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4){B); see also id. §§ 78dd-l(f){3){B), -3(f)(4)(B).
65. Id. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A)(i)-{ii), -2(h){3)(A)(i)-(ii), -3(f)(3)(A){i)-(ii).
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provision. 66 The distinction between decision-making and mandatory
authority is anything but clear. Some commentators argue that moving an
application to the top of the pile is in itself exercising decision-making
authority. 67 An even more difficult question arises when a payment is
made to expedite a matter that involves some future determination; e.g.,
the application must be reviewed for completeness before processing. 68
Although the payment may only have been intended to expedite the
process, it is impossible to prove the purpose of such a payment after the
fact. Or, more troubling, although the intent of the payment may have been
only to expedite a process, the foreign official may have interpreted the
payment as having a dual meaning.
The legitimate business exception is an affirmative defense available
lmder the FCPA. 69 It permits businesses to expend money to educate
government officials about their company, product, etc. 70 A company can
reimburse foreign officials for expenses incurred to promote, demonstrate,
or explain a product, or to execute or perform on a contract. The classic
example of this exception is a company payin:g for a government official
to visit a production factory or worksite. The outer boundaries of this
exception are not without confusion. For instance, how long can a trip last
before it turns into a vacation, and can the company pay for the family to
travel with the official?

66. The FCPA defines the performance of the following tasks as "routine governmental action":
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business
in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections
associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country;
(iv) providi..11g phone service, po,ver and water supply, loading and unloading caigo, or
protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or
(iv) actions of a similar nature.
!d.§§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A).
67. JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HUSISIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 44 n.67 (1997); see Taylor, supra note 20,
at 875.
68. Taylor, supra note 20, at 876.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-J(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2) (2000).
70. The statute reads in pertinent part:
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) of this section that( I) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable
and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a
foreign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.
!d.§§ 78dd-J(c), -2(c), -3(c).
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The last exception came as a concession to those who argued that the
FCPA unfairly disadvantaged American businesses in foreign countries.
Pursuant to this affirmative defense, the FCPA is inapplicable when a
c;ountry permits bribes in its legal code. 71 Notably, the exception requires
that the law be written, 71 which is rarely the case. Typically, countries that
accept bribery do so by not outlawing bribes. Some countries may not
73
codify permission because they view longstanding customs as law.
However, these practices fall short of the FCPA requirement that the law
be written. Corporations and individuals subject to FCPA coverage are
well advised not to neglect narrowness of this exception.
In addition to these obvious exceptions, there is another limitation in
the language of the statute that is often overlooked. For the bribe to be
actionable under the statute, the bribe must be made for the purpose of
obtaining or retaining business. 74 While a reading of the legislative history
regarding the 1988 amendme~ts reflects a congressional intent that the
statute be read broadly to proscribe payments for the purpose of gaining
influence with a foreign official, 75 the operative test under the statute is
whether such "payments [are] intended to assist the payor, either directly
or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person."76
Specifically, a prosecutor will satisfy the "business nexus" 77 test only
by demonstrating that the payment at issue was intended "to assist in
obtaining or retaining business."78 Under United States v. Kay, where the
prosecution did benefit from the court's adoption of a broad reading ofthe

71. Id. §§ 78dd-l(c)(l), -2(c)(l), -3(c)(l).
72. ld.
73. One commentary suggested that the FCPA needs to be expanded to recognize conduct
consistent with "customary law" as a permissible exception to the anti-bribery provisions. Taylor,
supra note 20, at 877.
74. "It shall be unlawful [to give gifts, etc. to a foreign official] in order to assist such domestic
concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-2(a)(l) (2004). Identical language is found in sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-3.
75. H.R. REP. No. 100-418, at 918 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,
1951.
76. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[B]ribes paid to foreign tax
officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall
within [the] broad coverage [ofFCPA].").
77. ld. at 743.
78. Id. at 755. In rejecting a narrow defense interpretation of "business," however, the Fifth
Circuit noted that "business" need not be restricted to business opportunities with the government, but
extends to business activities within a foreign country that may be aided by obtairiing a competitive
advantage by bribing a foreign official. See id. at 756 ("[B]y narrowly defining exceptions and
affirmative defenses against a backdrop of broad applicability, Congress reaffirmed its intention for
the statute to apply to payments that even indirectly assist in obtaining business or maintaining existing
business operations in a foreign country.") (emphasis added).
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statute, 79 merely showing that a defendant obtained beneficial treatment by
bribing a foreign official will not suffice. Simply put, the business nexus
test acts as another limitation on the application of FCPA to foreign
official bribes. This limitation, however, is tempered by a broad
interpretation of the term "business" that looks to whether the payment of
a bribe was intended as a means of securing a competitive advantage that
would result in obtaining or retaining business with any person within a
foreign country, not only with governmental parties. 80
As a final note, although not a formal part of the law, the DOJ has been
noted to rely upon advice of local counsel in its decision to initiate
proceedings for violations of the FCPA. 81 Obviouslyl this element would
factor into the mens rea requirement, particularly in the context of the
requirement that the act be "corrupt." If a person were acting under the
advice of counsel, it would strongly suggest that he was not attempting to
engage in a corrupt activity. However, advice of counsel never should be
considered relevant for the defense of legality under local law, because
that affirmative defense is only available when the law is written. Whether
or not a person had advice of counsel would have no bearing on the actual
state of the law in the country in question.
C. Enforce;nent

The FCPA is enforced through civil and criminal mechanisms.
Violators can be subject to fines and imprisonment. An individual can be
subject to fines as high as $100,000 and a prison term of up to five years. 82
For corporations, fines can be as high as two million dollars. 83 In the civil
realm, the government can seek prospective injunctions to prohibit a
person from making an illegal bribe84 and a civil penalty of up to
$10,000. 85 Fines imposed against officers, directors, employees, agents, or
stockholders of corporations may not be paid directly or indirectly by the
corporation. 86

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

!d. at 748 ("We conclude that the legislative intent was so broad.").
See supra note 78.
Taylor, supra note 20, at 882-83.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), -3(e)(2)(A) (2000).
!d.§§ 78dd-2(g)(l)(A), -3(e)(l)(A).
!d. §§ 78dd-2(d), -3(d).
!d.§§ 78dd-2(g)(l)(B), -2(g)(2)(B), -3(e)(J)(B), -3(e)(2)(B).
!d. §§ 78dd-2(g)(3), 78ff(c)(3).
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The DOJ and the SEC jointly enforce the PCPA. 87 The SEC primarily
enforces the PCPA through the accounting requirements placed upon
regulated corporations, 88 while the Attorney General ("AG") enforces the
an:ti~bribery provisions. 89 The SEC is generally responsible for enforcing
90
civif actions against issuers, although the AG is also authorized to do
so.91 The DOJ is the only agency capable of obtaining prospective
injunctions. 92 It should be noted that corporations are rarely prosecuted for
PCPA violations. The few times that PCP A charges have been brought,
they were an add-on to a lengthier indictment related to more serious
offenses. 93
In addition to the traditional prosecutorial role of the DOJ, it also
serves an advisory function by providing PCPA opinions to companies
regarding the propriety of a prospective transaction. 94 The AG will issue
opinions only on prospective, as opposed to hypothetical or completed
conduct. 95 The opinion has binding force, with some limits. For example,
an AG opinion creates a rebuttable presumption that conduct consistent
with the opinion did not violate the PCPA. 96 However, the AG can defeat
that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. 97 The opinion binds
only the parties that joined in the request98 and the DOJ. 99 This last
exception is notable because the SEC is expressly excluded from being
bound to the opinion. 100 This raises the question of how useful the PCP A
opinion is in practice. 101
87. s·. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
4109-10.
88. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) ("Every issuer of a security ... shall file with the Commission

....")
89. !d. §§ 78dd-2(g), -3(e), 78ff(c).
J. DeCosse & Susan S. Katcher, Newly Amended Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 63
(1990).
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), -2(g)(2)(B), -3(e)(1)(B), -3(e)(2)(B) (2000).
92. !d. §§ 78dd-2(d), -3(d).
93. Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct ofInter.n,atio_nal Business, 21 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 760 (1996).
94. 15 U.S. C.§ 77dd-1(e) (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2005).
95. 28 C.F.R. § 80.3 (2005).
96. !d. § 80.10 (2005).
97. !d.
98. !d. § 80.5.
99. !d.§§ 80.10, 80.1 1.
100. !d. § 80.12.
101. Since the creation of the review opinion process, only twenty-three requests have been made
to the DOJ. See Decosse & Katcher, supra note 90, at 61 (noting only twenty opinions as of 1990);
FCPA Op. No. 01-03, 2001 WL 34059037 (DOJ FCPA); FCPA Op. No. 98-02, 1998 WL 34068169
(DOJ FCPA); FCPA Op. No. 92-01, 1992 WL 12005339 (DOJ FCPA). More telling, in the past fifteen
years, there have only been three requests made. See FCPA Op. No. 01-03, 2001 WL 34059037 (DOJ

----·-·--90~-Stephen
WIS. LAW. 23, 61
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II. Biu:BING FOREIGN OFFICIALS MAY TRIGGER MONEY MOVEMENT
OFFENSES AND OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES BEYOND THE PCP A

U.S. corporations engaging in business abroad must take into account
various federal statutes that have both civil and criminal provisions. When
U.S. persons or corporations make financial transactions that are for or
connected to illegal transactions, such as bribing a foreign official, a
related number of criminal laws also may be violated. These and other
laws should be considered as a checklist when counsel is requested to
advise on payments to officials to obtain contracts, as well as in preparing
financial statements to obtain loans, tax planning, and responding to
potentially irregular or suspicious transactions .102 The list below offers a
brief, nonexhaustive summary of federal statutes that may be applicable in
instances ofbribery.
A. "Money Laundering" and Engaging in Monetary Transactions in
Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity

Sections 1956 and 1957 of Title 18 of the United States Code comprise
the federal money laundering statutes. These sections criminalize four
rl
.
103 (b) .
.
1 monetary
. .
.
(a/) money 1,aunuenng;
transactiOns:
~
mternatwna
d1stmct
105
104
transfers with a criminal intent; (c) "sting" offenses; and (d) monetary

FCPA); FCPA Op. No. 98-02, 1998 WL 34068169 (DOl FCPA); FCPA Op. No. 92-01, 1992 WL
12005339 (DOl FCPA). The low request number suggests that companies may not find the opinion
process helpful. See generally BUSINESS LAWS INC., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER
(Supp. 112, July 2005).
102. See discussion infra Part IILB and note 53.
103. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, knowing that the propert-y involved in a financial transaction represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct a financial
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) with the intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 720 I or 7206
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part(i)to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,
shall be sentenced to [fine or imprisonment].
! 8 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000).
104. The statute reads in pertinent part:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a
monetary instrument or funds from a place outside the United States or to a place in the
United States from or through a place outside the United States-
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transactions involving criminal proceeds exceeding $10,000. 106 Of
particular concern for our purposes are the prohibitions on monetary
transactions designed to avoid a reporting requirement. Because the FCPA
contains reporting requirements for SEC regulated entities, 107 transfers
related to a violation of the FCPA would likely also be designed to
circumvent the reporting requirements. Also notable is the prohibition
contained in subsection 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii), which relates to international
monetary transfers, the typical vehicle for payirig a foreign bribe. 108
B. Bribing and Other Federal Statutes

While bribing or attempting to bribe a foreign official, a U.S.
individual or corporation may trigger several federal statutes, whose
applicability will depend on the specific circumstances of the particular
bribing incident. The following is a nonexhaustive list: mail fraud/ 09 wire
fraud; 110 the "Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act"; 111 the

(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(B) !mowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation,
transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and
!mowing that such transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in part(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,
shall be sentenced to [fine or imprisonment).
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (2000). Similar to § 1956(a)(l ), this section is most relevant for its prohibition
on international money transfers designed to circumvent federal reporting requirements.
105. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, with the intent(A) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;
(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, source, ownership, or control of property
believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, conducts or
attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property represented to be the pro.ceeds
of specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or facilitate specified unlawful
·
activity, shall be [subject to fme and imprisonment].
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (2000).
106. "Whoever [as a United States citizen or while within the territories of the United States],
lmowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a
value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b)." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2000).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii).
109. !d. § 1341 (crirninalizing the use of U.S. Postal Service or private interstate carrier in
connection with a fraudulent scheme).
110. !d. § 1343 (crirninalizing the use of wire communications in connection with a fraudulent
scheme).
111. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000) (requiring all transportation of currency in excess of$10,000 to be
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"Internal Revenue Code"; 112 and the "False Statements Act"; 113 and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 114
C. A Note of Caution

Parts I and II not only summarize the full breadth of the FCPA, but also
showed how bribing foreign officials can trigger a number of other
predicate federal criminal offenses. In view of the undisputed moral
argument against bribery, any U.S. corporation that conducts even a small
amount of business overseas will benefit from having a formal, written
anti-bribery policy. This company policy should lay out procedures that
aid its directors, officers, employees, agents, and even stockholders to
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate proposals, and payments
and gifts to the different foreign officials covered by the statute.
U.S. companies' need for cautious conduct in their foreign transactions
is particularly heightened now that other developed (and some less
developed) countries have ratified the OECD Convention Against Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials ("OECD Convention"). By expanding the
applicability of anti-foreign bribery laws to major international
competitors of U.S. companies, the OECD Convention has further
reinforced this call for caution.
III. THE OECD CONVENTION AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS IN U.S. LAW
A. The Convention

Pursuant to article 15, paragraph 1, the OECD Convention entered into
force on February 15, 1999, sixty days after Canada (the fifth among
reported tg_ the United States Treasury). Bee Zagaris, supra note 93, at 779.
fi2. U.S. corporate taxpayers may not deduct bribes that are illegal under the FCPA. See I.R.C.
§ l62(c)(1), which states:
No deduction shaH· be allowed ... for any payment made, directly or indirectly, to an official
or employee of any government, or of any agency or instrumentality of any government, if
the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if the payment is to an official or
employee of a foreign government, the payment is unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977.
ld. Notably, where any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockbroker of a U.S. company is fined
for violating the FCPA, the U.S. company may not pay the fine or reimburse the individual who has
been fined. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(3) (2000).
113. Tllis statute prescribes crinlinal penalties for persons or corporations that "knowingly make
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements, or subnlit fraudulent documents to any department or agency
of the United States government." !d. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
- 114. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7211 (2000) (establishing and authorizing Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board to enforce accounting standards).
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member-countries with the largest ten export shares) deposited its
115
instrument of ratification. The Convention requires, among other things,
that signatories:
(1) adopt anti-bribery legislation barring the bribery of public
officials to obtain or retain any improper advantage in the conduct
of international business; 116

(2)criminalize or create civil liability for bribing public officials; 117
and
·
(3) require companies to keep accurate books and records to stymie
efforts to conceal corrupt payments. 118
The OECD Convention addressed two problems that previously had
affected FCPA enforcement: the question of jurisdiction 119 and the issue of
cooperation in extraditing and prosecuting offenders. 120
Regarding jurisdiction, tlie OECD Convention prescribed that
signatories shall assert jurisdiction both over acts committed within their
boundaries and over its citizens accused of engaging in proscribed conduct
anywhere. 121 This represents a significant departure from the FCPA's
territorially based approach to jurisdiction. 122 That approach had required
the use of the mail or an instrumentality of interstate commerce in
furtherance of a foreign bribe as a nexus for asserting jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. This significant change raises the stakes for U.S. companies
operating abroad. They now have to monitor compliance not only with an
eye to territorially-based acts, but also with respect to conduct by any U.S.
party anywhere in the world.
By requiring multilateral cooperation in the extradition and prosecution
of offenders, the OECD Convention also has simplified significantly the
investigatory hurdles the DOJ previously faced when dealing with

115. The other four countries were Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States..
The status of ratification and implementation is provided at the OECD's website, http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/59/13/1898632.pdf (last visited on Nov. 9, 2005). As of November 9, 2005, thirty-six
countries had deposited their instruments of ratification, among which, only Slovenia was still
expected to enact legislation implementing the Convention.
116. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1.
117. Id.; see also arts. 2, 3, para. 1.
118. I d. art. 8, para. 1.
119. ld. art. 4, paras. 1, 2.
120. Id. art. 10.
121. Id. art. 1, para. 4(a).
122. See discussion supra Part I. C.l.
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uncooperative countries. 123 More importantly, at least with respect to
signatory countries, this approach eliminates two basic defenses to
extradition: (a) that there is no extradition treaty; and (b) that the offense
charged is not extraditable under a preexisting treaty. 124
B. Domestic Repercussions

In July 1998, the Senate approved both the OECD Convention and the
implementing legislation. 125 Congress completed action on implementing
legislation in October 1998. 126 The President signed the implementing
legislation on November 10, 1998 and the ratification instrument on
November 20, 1998. 127 The United States deposited its instrument of
ratification with the OECD Secretary-General on December 8, 1998. 128
Adoption of the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998 129 brought the United States in conformity with the Convention. 130
The 1998 Amendments expanded the PCP A in several areas: (1) the class
of prohibited conduct; (2) extraterritorial jurisdiction over domestic
companies and nationals; 131 (3) jurisdiction over foreign companies and
nationals; and (4) the application of criminal sanctions against natural
persons regardless of nationality. These amendments sought to close
loopholes that had handicapped PCP A enforcement in the past. 132
First, before the 1998 amendments, a corrupt act was defined as a
payment to a foreign official, foreign political parties, party officials, and
candidates for the purpose of (i) influencing any act or decision of such
person or party in their official capacity, or (ii) inducing such person or
party to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lavvful duty of such

123. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 9.
124. Article l 0, paragraph 2 establishes that "a Party which makes extradition conditional on the
existence of an extradition treaty ... may consider this Convention to be the legal basis for extradition
in respect of the offence of bribery of a foreign public official." !d. art. 10, para. 2.
125. See Steps Taken and Planned Future Actions by Participating Countries to RatifY and
Implement the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, OECD BRJBERY CONVENTION: STATUS OF RATIFICATION I, 77 (2001), http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/50/33/1827022.pdf (last visited on Nov. 9, 2005) ("Steps Taken and Planned Future
Actions-Submissions as of 12 November 2004").
126. !d.
127. !d.
128. !d.
129. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 2375,
112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
130. See Deming, supra note 12, at 512.
131. See discussion supra Part l.B.1.
132. For a more detailed discussion of each of these changes, see Deming, supra note 12.
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official or party. 133 That definition has been amended and broadened to
contemplate a . payment to a foreign official to secure any improper
advantage. 134·
Second, besides expanding the jurisdictional basis for liability of U.S.
compa.Jiies and nationals, the 1998 Amendments also created a new basis
for civil and criminal penalties by imposing liability on any person,
de:fuied·as "any foreign national or company that is not an issuer and does
not have a principal place of business in the U.S., who commits any act in
the U.S. utilizing· the U.S. mails or other instrument of interstate
commerce mfurtherance of an unlawful, foreign bribe. " 135 This means that
a-·single aCt committed in the United States by a foreign non-resident
national could now subject a foreign company with no U.S. operations to
FCPA liability. On the other hand, a wholly owned foreign subsidiary that
acts completely· outside the United States in furthering a foreign bribe is
still not subject to FCPA liability if the U.S. parent does not take any part
in the proscribed conduct. 136
Finally, the 1998 Amendments eliminated a previous disparity in
sanCtions against U.S. and foreign nationals who are employees or agents
of a domestic company. 137 Previously, only U.S. nationals and permanent
residents were subjeCt to both civil and criminal sanctions, while foreign
non-resident nationals were subject only to civil penalties. 138 Since 1998,
all individuals are subject to both types of sanctions. 139 As I discussed
earlier, 140 criminal sanctions include imprisonment for up to five years and
fines of up $100,000 for individuals, or two million dollars for
corporations. 141
IV. SOME BRIBERY SCENARIOS AND SOME PUZZLING QUESTIONS

As the foregoing parts indicate, the legitimate concern with combating

Ori.oery; frrst by the United· States, and later by OECD members, has
culminated with the proscription by more than thirty countries of the
bribing of foreign officials. But these statutes can be very broad, and the

133. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1997).
134. !d. § 78dd-l (a) (2000).
135. !d. § 78dd-2(a).
136. The U.S. company, however, could be held liable if an agency relationship or other form of
vicarious liability (e.g., respondeat superior) is established.
137. See Deming, supra note 12, at 514.
138. 15 u.s.c. § 78dd-2(g) (1997).
139. Id. § 78dd-2(g) (2000).
140. See discussion supra Part I.B.l and accompanying notes.
141. See id.
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incentives for going forward with a highly profitable transaction
frequently lead to "rationalizations" that may stretch concepts as fluid as,
say, "grease payments" beyond reasonable bounds. It is no surprise, then,
that attorneys are frequently under enormous pressure 142 from their clients
to provide an unqualified legal opinion that a particular course of action
will not lead to violations, despite the ethical caveat that "[a] lawyer shall
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent .... " 143
In areas where an attorney cannot render a clean opinion, corporate
officers may face a difficult choice between losing a major sale and
running the risk, even if limited, of a criminal violation. This tension
between personal risk and corporate gain could create potential conflicts of
interest between the corporation and its officers, and for the attorneys who
represent them. 144 Certainly, issues under the FCPA and the OECD
Convention raise questions of liability both for the company and its
responsible officers-a situation which does not necessatily, but may raise
conflict problems. 145
As we consider the following hypothetical situations ((A)-(C)), it Is
worth keeping in mind the scope of the lawyer's role as advisor:
In representing a client, a lawyer shaU exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation. 146

142. This pressure may be exponentially heightened in situations where counsel is licensed to
practice law in a foreign jurisdiction, since the DOJ has noted that a factor in its decision to prosecute
is whether the domestic concern was acting under advice of local counsel when it engaged in the
questionable conduct. Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861, 877 (2001).
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
144. Panel discussion on Solving Your Clients' Sanctions and Export Control Problems, William
L. Clements, Lucinda A. Low, J. Scott Maberry, O'Neil Woelke, panelists, in GEORGETOWN UNIV.
LAW CTR., INTERNATIONAL TRADE UPDATE 2004: TRENDS, TIPS AND PRACTICAL ADVICE 136 (Jan.
29-30, 2004) (on file with author).
145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.l3(g) (2002). This rule generally permits a
lawyer to represent both an organization and any of its directors, officers, members, etc., subject to
Rule 1.7. Rule 1.7 generally prohibits a lawyer from representing a client "if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client." !d. R. 1.7(a)(I) (2002).
146. !d. R. 2.1 (2002) (emphasis added). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 78 (1983) ("Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations.").
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A. Hypothetical Situation: What is a Commission, What is a Bribe?

A U.S. manufacturer of irrigation valves is asked to supply a
Ruritanian 147 corporation with $500,000 worth of valves, an order that
would represent thirty percent of the U.S. company's yearly sales. The
U.S. manufacturer's Ruritanian "agent," a private party, requests that a
commercial invoice of $600,000 be presented with the goods to the
ultimate customer (the Ruritanian agricultural development agency), and
that the U.S. company, once it receives payment, deposit $100,000 of the
proceeds-a "commission"-in a numbered Swiss bank account. 148 The
sales manager for the U.S. company is aware that the normal commission
for such transaction is between two and five percent of the invoiced value,
and is aware that an abnormally high commission can trigger a "red flag"
under the company's FCPA compliance procedures.
It is not clear whether the recipient of these funds is a private or a
foreign official. Thus, the client would not know whether this is a
commission or a bribe. Being aware of how this sale so clearly affects his
client, how should counsel to the U.S. manufacturer advise his client?
At first, this example appears to present a straightforward decision
because the facts and legal issues are easily ascertainable, and they point
against going ahead with the transaction for a number of reasons. First, as
discussed above, 149 the term "knowing" includes "conscious disregard and
deliberate ignorance" and will not insulate a corporation from prosecution
under the PCP A. 150 A reasonable level of diligence thus is required and,
should this transaction be investigated, it would be very hard to
demonstrate that the client "actually believed" no bribery was involved. 151

147. Although I am assuming that Ruritania is a less developed country, I do not hold the na"ive
view that government official corruption only occurs in these countries.
148. The use of a Swiss bank account tci further an alleged bribery operation is one of the elements
of recent SEC civil injunctive action before the Southern District of New York. See SEC v. Joshua C.
Cantor, Civil Action No. 03 CV 2499 (LMM) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003). Among other charges, the
SEC alleges that the defendant "violated the anti-bribery provisions of the federal securities laws by
causing [his former employer] to pay $239,000 to a Swiss bank account for the purpose of influencing
or affecting the acts or decisions of one or more Saudi Arabian officials ... to assist [his former
employer] in obtaining or retaining business with that government." U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Litigation Release No. 18081 (Apr. 10, 2003), available at htpp://www.sec.gov/
litigationllitre!eases/lrl808l.htm. The factors in this hypothetical are in no way related to this case.
149. See supra Part l.B.2.
150. See Dep 't of Comm., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, supra note 40.
151. See H.R. REP. No. 576, supra note 48, at 920. See also id. at 1954.
[K]nowledge of a fact may be inferred where the defendant has notice of the high probability
of the existence of the fact and has failed to establish an honest, contrary disbelief. The
inference cannot be overcome by the defendant's "deliberate avoidance of knowledge," his or
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Second, though no foreign official is directly involved or even mentioned,
a twenty percent commission is highly suspicious, especially because the
client has paid much lower commissions, and counsel knows that willful
ignorance will not suffice as a defense to foreign bribery, particularly
where such discrepancies are involved. 152 Third, the use of an unnamed,
numbered Swiss bank account, while decreasing the risk of detection in
Ruritania and possibly in the United States, will implicate the client if this
transaction triggers an investigation. It creates an aura of secretiveness and
suspicion. 153
From a practical standpoint, however, this decision is more
complicated due to the potential gains from this transaction (i.e., thirty
percent of the company's sales in a year). The client may be strongly
dissuaded from heeding counsel's sound legal advice, and, worse, the
circumstances may cause the client to think counsel is too risk-averse or
merely· trying to protect himself from liability. These perceptions can
strain significantly the relationship between the client and his attorney,
thus creating perverse incentives for the latter to issue an opinion advising
the client to obtain assurances from the Ruritanian agent that the
commission money will not be siphoned off to local authorities and that it
is reasonably related to his activities as an agent. The business efficacy of
this opinion, however, is questionable, for it is doubtful that the agent will
agree to such stipulations.

B. Hypothetical Situation: What Is Missing When Paying a Bribe Is
Defined Only as Making a Payment or Conferring an Advantage to a
Foreign Public Official?
A U.S. citizen managing a wholly-owned Ruritanian subsidiary of a
U.S. infonnation technology company is approached by the head of the
local union and proposed the following: the union official will guarantee a
year of "labor peace" if the Ruritanian subsidiary pays the union leader
$1,000 per month into a designated account in a bank in Miami. Payment
of this "guarantee" would be worth far more to the company in

her "willful blindness," or his or her "conscious disregard," of the existence of the required
circumstance or result.
!d. (quoting United States v. Manrique Aribizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 (lOth Cir. !987), United States v.
Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 907 (!988), and United States v.
McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, !275 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985)).
!52. !d.
!53. These evading procedures are precisely what the original FCPA legislators intended to deter.
See id.
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maintaining continuity of its operations than the relatively minor cost of
the payment. The manager consults U.S. counsel and asks for an opinion.
Because the union official does not meet the definition of a "foreign
public official" under either the FCPA or the Convention, counsel can feel
secure to inform his client that the transaction is not illegal. This scenario,
however, shows a major gap in the current OECD/FCPA anti-foreign
bribery scheme: bribery which may seriously undermine a significant
foreign public interest, namely, that of having fairly uncorrupt labor
.
. unpunis
. he d. 154
umons,
may go
Although U.S. counsel may be aware that Ruritanian law obviously
proscribes such conduct, she knows that this may not figure as
prominently among her client's concerns as a full-blown DOJ or SEC
investigation. Counsel is nonetheless required to caution her client about
the possibility of foreign criminal and civil liability, and she is welladvised to abstain from suggesting to her client that this operation is
perfectly okay merely because it is beyond the scope of the PCP A and the
OECD Convention. 155 It should be clear to counsel that such a payment,
though occurring abroad, would be considered squarely corrupt and illegal
should it occur within the United States. 156
Moreover, this situation would further corruption in Ruritania as well
as com1pt the business practices of a U.S. company, which is at odds with
the policy aims of the FCPA. 157 This scenario is also at odds with other
cunent developments of international law in the areas of corruption and
bribery. Since 1998, the United Nations has been in the process of drafting
and promoting ratification of a convention 158 that encourages signatories to
adopt legislation that would deter both public and private acts of
conuption. 159 The United States is a signatory of this convention and,

154. As discussed below, the author is aware that article 21 of the new United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, U.N. Doc A/58/422 (adopted Oct. 31, 2003) ("U.N. Convention"), extends bribery
prohibitions to actions between private individuals.
155. As discussed supra, the FCPA and OECD Convention only targets bribery of foreign
officials, not of private individuals. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a), -3(a); OECD Convention, supra
note 9, art. 1, para. I .
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) and (b) (Taft-Hartley Act).
157. See DOJ Website, supra note 6 ("Congress enacted the FCPA to bring a halt to the bribery of
foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business system.").
158. The U.N. Convention entered into force on December 14, 2005. Press Release L/T/4389,
U.N. Department of Public Information, Convention against Corruption ratified by 30th state, Will
Enter into Force 14 December 2005, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/Jt4389.doc.htm.
159. The U.N. Convention provides:
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and. other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally in the course of
economic, fmancial or commercial activities:
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presumably, with its ratification would implement laws to prohibit
transactions such as the one described in this hypothetical, or at least to
establish its jurisdiction over the acts of a U.S. national committed in
Ruritania that would be in violation of either U.S. or Ruritanian bribery
laws. Until that time, U.S. lawyers are placed in the awkward position of
having to balance ethical and professional dilemmas with their clients'
commercial interests.
Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct suits this situation
very well: "a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant
to the client's situation." 160 In this situation, counsel is directed by both
domestic law as it currently stands as well as developments in
international law that signal that the proposed transaction should be
discouraged. 161

if a Charitable Donation Comes Close to
the Functional Equivalent of a Bribe?

C. Hypothetical Situation: What

A U.S.-based telecommunications company, and other U.S. and foreign
competitors are seeking a concession with a state government in Ruritania,
a densely populated nation, to lay and operate a multi-billion fiber optic
data transmission network. Ruritania's Minister of Telecommunications
suggests to the U.S. company's Chief Operations Officer ("COO") that
some sort of substantial demonstration of the firm's "commitment" to its
Ruritanian expansion would greatly increase the company's chances of

(a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any
person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person
himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties,
act or refrain from acting;
(b) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any person
who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or
herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or
refrain from acting.
U.N. Convention, supra note 154, art. 2 I.
In addition, the U.N. Convention gives a State Party jurisdiction over an act of correction if the
offense is committed by a national of that State Party or a stateless person who has his or her habitual
residence in its territory. fd. art. 42(b).
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002).
161. From a strictly a moral standpoint, counsel should consider that advising the client to go
through with such a transaction would violate various human rights of the workers involved,
effectively imposing silence against potential labor abuses, and also would impede the workers'
realization of their human right to a corruption-free society. See N diva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a
Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption
to a Crime Under International Law, 34 lNT'L LAW. 149 (Spring 2000).
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winning the concession award. As the COO explains the provisions of the
FCPA to the Minister, she perceives his distancing and skeptical facial
expressions with respect to the likelihood of her company's chances of
being selected. The COO now is convinced that failure to respond
positively to the Minister's opening will result in loss of the contract, but
she has no intention of exposing either her company or herself to criminal
liability. She contacts the corporation's U.S. headquarters and hears from a
company official that perhaps the Minister is more interested in political
gain and power than "ach1al bribery." Headquarters then suggests that she
propose that the U.S. company will build and fully fumish a new two
million dollar public library and museum in the official's electoral district,
if awarded the telecom contract. The company official suggests that the
U.S. company would donate the money to a U.S. foundation that would
disburse the funds to a local charity, which then would hire local
contractors selected tmder a closed-bid scheme, but that at no moment
would the Minister have access to the funds. The Minister would
obviously be invited to, and would also appear prominently in, the opening
festivities. Counsel is requested to provide his own certification that this
deal complies with the FCPA and the OECD Convention.
Because the foreign official will have no access to the donated money
and receive no ascertainable value-only a fairly remote opportunity for
political gain-this transaction may fall beyond the scope of the FCPA's
definition of "corrupt payment." 162 Yet, this situation is beyond the
innocuous charitable donations that the DOJ has previously determined
not to investigate under the FCPA. 163 The transaction presented here
involves a narrow political quid pro quo in which the involvement of the
foreign official is central to the charitable offer. As this sihmtion has the

162. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77dd-l(a), dd-2(a), dd-3(a).
163. In two separate Opinion Procedure Releases, the DOJ indicates that charitable donations by a
company either already engaged in the construction of a plant or planning to acquire and operate a
plant in a foreign country will not be investigated. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, Opinion
Procedure Release, No. 97-02, Nov. 5, 1997, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
o9702.htm (donating $100,000 for a proposed school construction project is acceptable because the
donation was made directly to the government entity responsible for the construction, not to any
foreign official) (last visited Nov. 9, 2005); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, Opinion Procedure
Release, No. 95-01, Jan. 11, 1995, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/o950l.htm
(approving a donation of $10 million in a public ceremony for the construction of a medical facility in
the region where a U.S. company plans to acquire and operate a plant, where the donation was made
through a charitable organization incorporated in the United States and through a limited liability
company in the foreign nation, both of which signed certifications that none of the funds will be
offered in violation of the FCPA, none of the persons involved were affiliated with the foreign
government, and the company required audited financial reports detailing the disposition of the
donated funds) (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
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basic characteristics of a bribe (although lacking in tangible value), if it
were made apparent to the DOJ, the latter would likely initiate an
investigation. Thus, counsel again is faced with a hard decision: .while this
transaction would appear to be a purely charitable donation, the addition of
certain internal facts changes its character to one that is suspicious and far
from innocent.
Furthennore, it is at least arguable that this transaction would come
under the purview of the "undue pecuniary or other advantage" language
of the OECD Convention. 164 Opponents of such a broad reading could
plausibly claim that any further stretching of the definitions of "paying,
offering or giving something of value," 165 or "intentionally offering,
promising or giving any undue pecuniary or other advantage" 166 to cover
situations like these would render illegal virtually all contact between
private interests and government officials, no matter how tenuous the
connection, merely because such conduct results in political gain for the
latter. Yet, the laws implementing the Convention in various signatory
countries certainly leave open the possibility that offering or giving such a
donation would be an "undue advantage" or "bribe." 167 This leaves

164. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. I, para. I.
165. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77dd-l(a}, -2(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
166. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).
167. OECD country reports on the signatory states' implementation of the Convention reveal that
some states envision a very broad interpretation of bribe or undue advantage. See OECD, Country
Reports on the Implementation of the Convention, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/24/
0,2340,en_2649_34859_1933144_l_l_l_l,OO.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). For example, the
Luxembourg Criminal Code includes in its definition of a bribe "any advantages whatsoever,"
reflecting their desire to cover "any other advantage whatsoever, whether material, intellectual or
social, for the offender or for any other person ... [and] approaches of all kinds, recommendations,
favorable interventions, votes, sexual relations, etc." OECD, LtLtembourg: Review of Implementation
of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 5, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/
40/2019732.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). The Slovak Criminal Code and Slovak Authorities define
bribery as an undue advantage in the form of a pecuniary or natural performance, or any other
advantage (e.g., mutual service or assistance) and that it comprises anything that can be defined as a
benefit, including "dealing with a case in a shorter time as usual, the offering of a better carrier
perspective or promotion, or the granting of additional holidays." OECD, Slovak Republic Review of
Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 4, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/l6/l5/2389408.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). Usually, a bribe is any advantage, with only
small exceptions for gifts or advantages of minor value or that are "socially acceptable," or in some
cases if it is permitted by law or case law. See id. See also OECD, France: ReFiew of Implememation
of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 6, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
24/50/2076560.pdf ("corruption involves the act of proposing 'without right' .... [T]he tenn without
right means that the advantage is neither permitted by law nor required by any statute or case law
currently in force.") (last visited Nov. 9, 2005); OECD, Korea: Review of Implementation of the
Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 2, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/6/
2388296.pdf ("case law confirms that the advantage, which is the substance of the bribe, includes
money, goods and other pecuniary advantages, as well as intangible benefits (such as the opportunity
of having a sexual relationship) that satisfy the demand or desire of a person.") (last visited Nov. 9,
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counsel in a particularly perplexing position, as it is far from clear whether
this transaction would be prohibited, given that it would depend on how
Ruritania adopted the Convention and interpreted its meaning.
In addition, even if one assumed that this transaction does not implicate
either the FCPA or the OECD Convention, this does not mean that this
transaction is fair. Indeed, to focus only on a given client's civil or
criminal liability deflects attention from the inherently unfair nature of
such transaction, for one of its direct consequences is that both U.S. and
non-U.S. competitors of the successful corporation here might never get a
fair chance. This scenario then shows another major gap in the current
anti-foreign bribery scheme: charitable contributions that come fairly close
to the functional equivalent of a bribe will continue to undermine the
inherent fairness of foreign transactions if they are not required to be
disclosed fully well in advance of a final foreign contract award.
One may posit, however, that requiring full disclosure of donations
linked to international business transactions would not ultimately improve
fairness in international business transactions because competitors might
then try to hide such contributions, or merely engage in outright corruption
efforts. But this "race to the bottom" argument will not carry the day so
long as the current anti-bribery regime is kept in place. Moreover,
requiring more disclosure while keeping or increasing the current level of
enforcement may have quite a different result: it may provide strong
incentives for a "race to the top" in terms of foreign competition. We need
not look much farther than at the present example. If disclosure is
required, the U.S. telecom might be forced to "up the ante" after one of its
competitors makes a higher "chmitable donation." Whoever makes a more
significant "bid" will win the contract.
CONCLUSION

As required by the FCPA and other federal statutes, companies
engaged in international business transactions must exercise great care in
ensuring their compliance with the rules governing such transactions.
While the OECD Convention closely resembles the FCPA, it is clear that

2005).
Moreover, one can argue that the U.N. Convention may also require states to bar this type of
transaction regardless whether it involves a public or private figure. The U.N. Convention prohibits,
with respect to both public and private figures, making a promise, gift, offer, solicitation, or
acceptance of an "undue advantage." U.N. Convention, supra note 154, arts. 16, 21. Again, this
depends upon a broad reading of the term "bribe" or "undue advantage," which as discussed above,
many countries have already adopted in their implementing statutes.
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it effectuated a tremendous change. Due to the OECD Convention's
adoption by more than thirty-five nations, the United States is no longer
the sole country with clear policies and laws geared towards fighting
corruption in foreign transactions. 168 Fmihermore, the Convention's
importance lies in the fact that it provides for essential mutual legal
assistance among signatory countries. 169 This development has led a
commentator to indicate that the Convention "will enable U.S. authorities
to acquire evidence that typically was not obtainable in the past." 170
The net result of these developments is that international legal
practitioners not only are going to be at the forefront of the developing
anti-bribery mechanisms, but will also be more often challenged by them.
So long as clients tread the fine line that separates legality from bribery,
lawyers will have to rely on the ethical principles contained in the
professional rules of conduct. Neither the FCPA nor the OECD
Convention are equipped to deter all forms of foreign corruption that may
occur. In the end, as is the case in other legal areas, there is no substitute
for professional and ethical judgment.

168. See Steps Taken and Planned Future Actions by Participating Countries to Ratify and
Implement the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Information as of 17 December 2003, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/33/1827022.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
169. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 9.
170. Deming, supra note 12, at 515.

